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How does globalization affect the tax burden on labour income, capital income and 
consumption in different welfare regimes? 
The case of Western and Eastern EU Member States 
Summary 
This paper analyzes the effects of globalization on implicit tax rates (ITRs) on labour 
income, capital income, and consumption in the EU15 and Central and Eastern European New 
Member States (CEE NMS). We find a positive effect of globalization on the ITR on labour 
income in the EU15, but no effect on the ITR on capital income, and a negative effect of 
globalization on ITR on consumption. In the CEE NMS there is no effect of globalization on 
any of the three ITRs. We also find differences among the welfare regimes within the EU15. 
Globalization has a particularly strong effect in the social democratic regime on all ITRs.  
Globalization has a statistically significant negative effect on the ITR on capital income in the 
social-democratic and southern regimes, a marginally significant negative effect in the liberal 
regime, and no significant effect in the conservative regime. Regarding the ITR on 
consumption, there is a significant negative effect of globalization in the social-democratic, 
conservative, and liberal regimes. In the case of the ITR on labour income, globalization 
causes an increase in all four welfare regimes.   
 
 
Key words: globalization, implicit tax rate on labour income, capital income, and 
consumption, welfare regimes 
JEL Code: H23, H24, H25, F19, F21  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
This paper analyzes the effects of globalization on the taxation of labour income, 
capital income, and consumption in the EU Member States. The theory of tax competition 
argues that, as capital becomes increasingly more mobile, firms are able to avoid high taxes 
by choosing countries with a low capital tax burden, which may result in inefficiently low 
taxes on capital income and inefficiently low public good provision (Oates (1972); Zodrow 
and Mieszkowski (1986); Tanzi (1995); Bucovetsky (1991); Wilson (1999); Brueckner 
(2000); Krogstrup (2004)). However, fewer possibilities to tax mobile capital also implies that 
more immobile tax bases, notably labour income and consumption, should bear the tax burden 
necessary to finance a given level of public expenditures.   
Indeed, an already extensive empirical literature is available which explores the impact 
of globalization on the level of the capital income tax burden as well as the tax burden on 
more immobile tax bases. In this literature, four different measures of tax burden are used : (i) 
statutory tax rates on corporate income (STR), (ii) corporate income tax revenues as a 
percentage of GDP or total tax revenues, (iii) implicit tax rates (ITR)
2
 on capital income, 
corporate income, labour income and on consumption expenditures of the Mendoza et al. 
(1994) type, and iv) effective marginal and average tax rates on corporate income (EMTR and 
EATR) of the Devereux and Griffith (1998) type.  
Studies that test the effect of globalization on the level of STR or EATR (see Swank 
and Steinmo (2002); Slemrod (2004); Clausing (2007) on STR, and Krogstrup (2005); Dreher 
(2006a); Garretsen and Peeters (2007); Loretz (2008) on EATR) generally find a negative 
effect. The empirical results on the effects on the ITR on capital income are inconclusive: 
Dreher et al. (2008), Swank and Steinmo (2002), and Swank (2006) find no effect; Dreher 
(2006a) estimates a positive effect, whereas Winner (2005) finds a negative effect. Using the 
ITR on corporate income, Adam and Kammas (2007), Bretschger (2008) and Bretschger and 
Hettich (2002) also find a negative effect of globalization. Quinn (1997) finds a positive effect 
on corporate tax revenues as a percentage of GDP and total revenues.  
Concerning ITR on labour income, Adam and Kammas (2007), Winner (2005) and 
Dreher et al. (2008) find a positive effect of globalization.
 
Dreher (2006a) finds no effect, 
while Swank and Steinmo (2002) find a negative effect. Furthermore, Bretschger and Hettich 
(2002) explore the globalization impact on the ratio of the ITR on labour income to that on 
corporate income. They find a positive relationship which signals that the tax burden is shifted 
to labour income. Winner (2005) likewise finds a shift from capital to labour income taxation. 
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 ITRs are also referred as average effective tax rates (AETR). 
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Regarding the globalization effects on the ITR on consumption, Swank and Steinmo (2002), 
Dreher (2006a), and Dreher et al. (2008) find no effect.  
The empirical evidence available so far points towards a negative relationship between 
globalization and tax law based measures of the corporate income tax burden (STR, EATR) as 
well as an increase in the tax burden on labour income. Yet, notable features of the existing 
literature are that these studies (i) are predominantly based on a sample of advanced OECD 
countries and (ii) do not separate the globalization effects by welfare regimes. 
This paper adds to the literature by including the Central and Eastern European New 
EU Members States (CEE NMS) in the country sample and by focusing on differences in 
globalization effects between Western (EU15) and CEE NMS. A second novelty of the paper 
lies in exploring differences in globalization effects across welfare regimes based on an 
"augmented" Esping-Andersen typology. However, due to limited time-series data for the CEE 
NMS, the latter analysis is only carried out for the EU15. 
Although most of the CEE countries reformed their tax systems along western lines 
during the transition period (Campbell (2005)), analyzing the CEE NMS in isolation is 
meaningful for several reasons: first, CEE NMS governments have been especially active in 
using cuts in effective corporate income tax rates (e.g. Bellak and Leibrecht (2009)), 
introducing flat rate personal income taxes (e.g. Keen et al. (2008)) and creating special 
economic zones (e.g. World Bank (2008)) to attract foreign capital (esp. Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI)). Second, the tax reforms have probably led to a profit-shifting response of 
multinational enterprises, which have tried to make use of the lower statutory corporate tax 
rates in the transition countries (Devereux (2007)). Third, the transition crisis has posed quite 
extensive fiscal needs in terms of increased unemployment and early pension schemes, which 
may have shaped taxation decisions (Havlik and Landesmann (2005)). Fourth, the tax structure 
is quite different in the CEE NMS, e.g. the share of indirect taxes in tax revenues is on average 
much higher than in the EU15 (e.g. EU Commission (2009: 58)). Fifth, the extent of the 
informal economy, which is much higher than in EU15, may have increased the preference of 
the governments for lower tax rates on income to create incentives for formalization as well as 
a higher share of taxes on consumption (Duman (2009)).  
With respect to the separation by welfare regimes, Campbell (2005) suggests that 
national political and economic institutions mediate how states react to the pressures of 
globalization. Thus, the institutional environment limits the degree to which national tax 
regimes converge in response to globalization. Specifically, the institutional configuration of 
national politics shapes actors‟ political tax policy strategies. This is in line with the argument 
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that welfare regimes display path-dependency, and only change gradually within specified 
paths (Scharpf and Schmidt (2000); Esping-Andersen (1996); Swank (2001)). Different 
welfare states create different expectations and dependency relations among the citizens, which 
cannot be changed quickly given electoral considerations (Kautto and Kvist (2002)). This also 
affects tax policy. For instance, Campbell (2005) argues that the type of labour and business 
organizations affects the sorts of tax policies these organizations are willing to support. If 
labour is politically influential, unions support relatively high taxes because they expect this 
to finance expenditures like social protection. Indeed, Campbell (2005) finds that social-
democratic countries set the highest tax rates on both labour and capital income, as they 
utilize the tax revenue to finance welfare spending and the tax burden is lowest in the liberal 
welfare state. 
We find supportive evidence for an increase in the ITR on labour income and a 
decrease in the ITR on consumption in response to globalization in the EU15. We do not find 
a significant effect of globalization on the ITR on capital income, although EATRs on 
corporate income decrease due to globalization. However there are important differences 
among the welfare regimes within the EU15. Globalization has a statistically significant 
negative effect on the ITR on capital income in the social-democratic and southern regimes, a 
marginally significant negative effect in the liberal regime, and no significant effect in the 
conservative regime. Regarding the ITR on consumption, the negative effect of globalization 
applies to the social-deomocratic, conservative, and liberal regimes, but not to the southern 
regime. In the case of the ITR on labour income, globalization causes an increase in all four 
welfare regimes. In the CEE NMS globalization has no effect on any of the ITRs, though 
EATRs are negatively affected by globalization. 
The paper is structured as follows: Section two reviews the literature on welfare regime 
typologies. Section three describes how we measure tax burdens and the globalization process. 
It also includes some empirical, stylized facts. Section four introduces the control variables 
used in the empirical analysis. Section five presents the estimation methodology and section 
six discusses the results. Section seven concludes.  
 
II. GROUPING OF COUNTRIES INTO WELFARE REGIMES 
The welfare state literature indicates considerable heterogeneity among the Western 
European countries related to the institutional setting of a country. Esping-Andersen (1990) 
 
developed a widely used typology of three welfare regimes, grouping countries based on their 
stratification, decommodification, and the mix between private and public social security 
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institutions. The first group consists of social-democratic regimes which are universalistic and 
egalitarian with high degrees of decommodification, little stratification and social security 
payments provided universally by the state (Sweden, Finland, Denmark, Norway). The second 
comprises conservative regimes strongly associated with employment protection, with the 
family at the heart of the protection, a medium decommodification, and social security 
provided partly by the state and partly by the market (Germany, France, Austria, Belgium, 
Italy, Japan, Switzerland and the Netherlands). Finally, the third group encompasses liberal 
regimes with low decommodification, high stratification, restricted role of the state, a low level 
of social security, and a significant private insurance contribution (UK, USA, Ireland, Canada, 
Australia).  This classification is later extended by adding a separate welfare regime group for 
the southern European countries (Italy, Spain, Greece, Portugal) by Ferrera (1996) and Bonoli 
(1997). As opposed to previous research which treats countries like Spain, Portugal and Greece 
as latecomers on the same path of continental conservative welfare states, Ferrera (1996) 
argues that southern countries are inter alia characterized by a highly fragmented and polarized 
welfare regime with generous pensions paired with substantial gaps in the social safety net, a 
departure from the corporatist tradition in the field of health care, a highly collusive mix 
between public and private institutions in the welfare sphere and the persistence of clientelism 
in the distribution of cash subsidies.    
Due to its wide use in the literature, we use Esping-Andersen‟s classification. Although 
these welfare regimes are developed based on social expenditure structures, they reflect 
institutional and political structures that might determine the influence of social actors on tax 
policy. Furthermore, expenditure structures create a path dependency that also locks in tax 
regimes (Scharpf and Schmidt (2000); Esping-Andersen (1996); Swank (2001)). As discussed 
in Section 3 on the stylized facts of the tax rates on capital and labour income and 
consumption, the tax structures of welfare regimes can be quite different.  
While some studies see welfare states in the CEE NMS within the liberal regime based 
on a mix of social insurance and social assistance, and a partial privatization of social policy 
with just a few corporatist attributes (e.g. Ferge (2001), Standing (1996)), others argue that the 
CEE NMS constitute a separate post-socialist regime type (Aidukaite (2004), Lelkes (2000)). 
Nölke and Vliegenthart (2009) argue that the CEE NMS form a dependent market economy 
model that differs from coordinated or liberal market economies due to its dependency on 
foreign capital. Fenger (2007) distinguishes a "post-communist European type" and a "former 
USSR type", where the former mixes characteristics of both the conservative and the social-
democratic types. Bohle and Greskovits (2007) distinguish between a neoliberal type in the 
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Baltic States, an embedded neoliberal type in the Visegrad states, and a neo-corporatist type in 
Slovenia. Alternatively, Orenstein and Hass (2005) distinguish between European and 
Eurasian post-communist welfare states where the European category includes all CEE NMS 
as well as other former Yugoslav republics. According to Orenstein and Haas (2005), good 
prospects of joining the EU pushed for the development of welfare states in the CEE NMS, 
and they therefore find less of a difference between the Baltic countries and the other countries 
within the CEE NMS. 
These studies suggest that the countries in the CEE NMS constitute a welfare regime in 
transition different from those found in the EU15. Therefore, we estimate the effects of 
globalization on taxes separately for the EU15 and the CEE NMS. However, further tests of 
diversity among the CEE NMS are not possible due to limited degrees of freedom. 
 
III. MEASURING TAX BURDEN AND GLOBALIZATION 
1. Measuring the tax burden on capital income, labour income and consumption 
As mentioned, different types of tax rates are used as dependent variables in empirical 
studies. STRs on corporate income are taken directly from the tax code, however they do not 
account for the changes in the tax base. EMTR and EATR on corporate income are calculated 
based on the neoclassical investment theory and on actual and future tax law data. They 
measure the tax burden on a hypothetical investment project (Devereux and Griffith (1998))
3
. 
These rates are thus forward looking rates. ITRs are calculated by dividing the total tax 
revenue from capital income, labour income or consumption by the pre-tax income of the 
respective production factor or consumption (e.g. corporate income tax revenues divided by 
gross operating surplus).
4
 These rates are backward looking rates and are available not only 
for corporate income but also for capital, labour income and consumption. Therefore ITRs are 
especially suitable for exploring whether globalization has led to a decline in the tax burden 
on capital and an increase in the tax burden on labour and/or consumption within a unified 
framework. 
For this reason we base our analysis mainly on ITRs. However, we also explore the 
effects of globalization on the level of EATRs to highlight the difference in the globalization 
effects between backward and forward looking measures of corporate tax burden.  
For the ITRs we use Eurostat data (see European Commission (2009)). The advantage 
                                                        
3 The EMTR is based on the costs of capital of an investment project at the break-even point. The EATR 
measures the tax burden on a project earning a positive economic rent. 
4
 A widely used method to calculate ITRs using National Accounts data has been developed by Mendoza et al.. 
(1994). 
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of the Eurostat dataset is that it is the first to cover all 27 EU member states, including the CEE 
NMS. Two data sources are used for the ITRs: The data for the period starting in 1995 is taken 
from Eurostat database. For the period prior to 1995 European Commission provides the data 
in its publication (European Commission (2000)). The growth rate of this data is used to 
extend the Eurostat data backwards from 1995 to 1970 or 1980.
5
 The time period for most 
CEE NMS ranges from 1995 to 2007. The data on the ITR on capital in Romania, Bulgaria 
and Slovenia, which only begins in the late 1990s, is further extended backwards to 1995 with 
own calculations, based on the method used by the European Commission (2000).
6
 In sum, 
the data reaches back to 1970 for nine EU15 countries
7
, to 1980 for six EU15 countries
8
, and 
to 1995 for most CEE NMS (see Tables A.1 and A.2). Data on EATR for EU15 is taken from 
Michael Devereux‟s IFS homepage and from Devereux et al. (2008). For the CEE NMS, the 
data is from Devereux et al. (2008). Thus, EATR data for the EU15 ranges from 1982 to 2005 
and 1998-2006, respectively. The EATR data for the CEE NMS is available for the period 
between 1998 and 2006. 
In OECD countries, STR on corporate income increased until the late 1970s and began 
dropping significantly from the second half of the 1980s onward (Devereux (2007)). Like 
STRs, both EMTR and EATR on corporate income have constantly fallen since the 1980s, as 
can be seen in Figure 1a-b. This trend also applies to the CEE NMS. 
 
[Figure 1a-b about here] 
 
Figures 2a-c show the development of the ITR on capital income, consumption and 
labour income in the EU15 grouped by welfare state regimes and the CEE NMS (unweighted 
average).  
 
[Figures 2a-c about here] 
 
The ITR on capital income stayed rather stable at 24,9% (overall sample mean) due to 
a broadening of the tax base, particularly in the case of corporate income (rising profits, legal 
changes regarding deductions, allowances etc.; see Devereux et al. (2002); European 
Commission (2008)). Regarding the different welfare regimes, since the 1970s the ITR on 
                                                        
5 For data availability see Table A.1. 
6 For the ITR on capital income tax revenue on capital income is divided by operating surplus (data source: 
Eurostat) 
7
 Belgium, Germany, Denmark, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxemburg, Netherlands, United Kingdom. 
8 Austria, Spain, Finland, Greece Portugal, Sweden. 
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capital income has fallen in the liberal welfare regime (apart from a recent increase) and risen 
in the social-democratic regime with stronger upturns and downturns. In the southern regime 
the ITR on capital income which was formerly lower than in the other welfare regimes has 
risen strongly since the mid-1990s. In the conservative regime it rose in the early 1970s and 
then has decreased slightly. Within the conservative regime France is a particular exception 
with a continuously increasing ITR on capital. In the CEE NMS the mean of the ITR on 
capital income is much lower than in the EU15 (16% compared to 27%, as can be seen in 
Tables A.3 and A.4). The highest rate is for the Czech Republic with 25.9% and it is as low as 
10% in the Baltic countries. The average in the CEE NMS decreased until 2000 and then 
slightly increased.  
However, there are also important differences in the trends among the CEE NMS. 
While in Slovenia the ITR on capital has risen from a very low level, it has decreased in 
Latvia and Estonia, and it plummeted from a higher level in Slovakia while remaining quite 
stable in most other CEE NMS. 
The ITRs on labour are on average higher than those on capital. The development has 
been more homogenous among the different welfare regimes in the EU15 with an overall 
increasing trend in most countries compared to the early 1970s. Countries in the social-
democratic welfare regime have the highest ITR on labour income which has risen until the 
turn of the millennium and has decreased since then. The lowest ITR on labour income is 
levied by the liberal regime. It rose until the late 1980s, since which it has decreased slightly. 
The ITR on labour income in countries of the conservative regime lies between those of the 
social-democratic and the liberal regime, and has constantly risen almost converging with that 
of the social-democratic regime eventually. The ITR on labour income in the southern regime 
has also constantly risen, although it is still lower than that of the conservative and social-
democratic welfare regimes. The ITR on labour income in the CEE NMS is higher than in the 
EU15, although the difference is relatively small (37% to 33%, as can be seen in Tables A.3 
and A.4). The average in the CEE NMS is at about the same level as in the conservative 
regime, with Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovenia showing the highest rates. On 
average, the ITR on labour in the CEE NMS remained quite stable or declined slightly. 
Combining this with the lower ITR on capital, it can be argued that the CEE NMS rely more 
heavily on labour taxes.  
With respect to the ITR on consumption, the social-democratic countries once again 
show the highest ITR by far. It rose in the late 1980s, decreased in the early 1990s and since 
then has stayed more or less constant. In the liberal regime the ITR on consumption increased 
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during the late 1970s and early 1980s, and has decreased slightly since 1985. In the 
conservative welfare regime the ITR on consumption rose somewhat since the 1990s. Again 
in southern countries the ITR on consumption is lower than in the EU15. However, it has 
been constantly rising, with a particularly strong increase in the late 1980s and early 1990s. 
The level of the ITR on consumption in the CEE NMS corresponds to the level in the 
conservative and liberal regime, with a decline until the early 2000s which has reversed in 
recent years. 
Overall, the descriptive analysis of the ITRs underlines the relevance of estimating 
different effects of globalization among welfare regimes.  
 
2. Measuring the globalization process 
Globalization is a multi-facetted phenomenon comprising economic, social, 
institutional and political aspects (Dreher (2006b); Dreher et al., (2008)). In the empirical 
literature globalization is frequently measured by a country‟s openness to trade or FDI (see 
Gemmel et al. (2008) for a review). However, using either trade or FDI to measure 
globalization, thus excluding other flows of income and capital or changes in de jure measures 
or social and political dimensions of globalization might result in biased estimates (Dreher et 
al. (2008)). We therefore base our analysis on the KOF globalization indices, developed by 
Dreher (2006b) and Dreher et al. (2008), which incorporate these different dimensions.
 
These 
are weighted indices of various globalization variables, where the weights are determined via 
principle component analysis. Each variable entering the KOF measure is transformed to an 
index on a scale from 1 to 100, where 100 is the maximum value of the variable in the period 
1970 to 2006. The data is transformed according to the percentiles of the original distribution. 
For the current analysis the KOF indices have the additional advantage of also being available 
for the CEE NMS. 
We use two different KOF indices, one capturing economic globalization and one also 
considering social, political and institutional aspects of the globalization phenomenon: (a) 
KOFecon which incorporates actual FDI, income and trade flows, as well as legal restrictions 
on FDI and trade. The “flow-part” of the index brings together FDI stock and flows, exports 
and imports, portfolio investments (stock of assets and liabilities) and income payments to 
foreign nationals, all normalized by GDP. The “restrictions-part” of the index includes de jure 
measures of formal openness such as hidden import barriers, mean tariff rates, taxes on 
international trade as a percentage of current revenue and capital account restriction; (b) 
KOFglobal which combines economic globalization with social and political globalization, 
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incorporating the number of embassies and high commissions in the country, the number of 
international organizations of which the country is a member, the number of international 
treaties signed, personal contacts, information flows and cultural proximity (Dreher (2006b)). 
 
IV. CONTROL VARIABLES 
In addition to the globalization variables, further explanatory variables capturing 
mainly domestic determinants of tax rates are included in the estimations as control variables 
bringing together different explanatory variables in the previous empirical literature (e.g. 
Dreher (2006a); Adam and Kammas (2007); Bretschger and Hettich (2002); Swank and 
Steinmo (2002); Winner (2005)).  
Total expenditures of general government as a ratio to GDP (variable expenditures) 
should be positively related to ITRs since they induce higher financial needs.  
The general government consolidated gross debt as percent of GDP (debt) can have 
either a positive or negative effect on ITRs. On the one hand public debt can serve as 
substitute for taxes: when taxes are lowered, expenditures have to be financed by debt. On the 
other hand there exists a borrowing effect: the higher the public debt, the more taxes have to 
be levied to pay for the debt.  
The population older than 65 years as a share of total population (oldage) is expected 
to be positively correlated with implicit tax rates, because a higher share of dependent 
population results in higher fiscal needs. Furthermore, with a higher fraction of elderly 
people, the labour force shrinks, leading to a higher financial burden per employee.  
The growth rate of real GDP (growth) aims to capture cyclical effects and is expected 
to have a negative effect on labour and capital tax rates. Based on a tax competition model 
with a balanced budget, rational governments will lower tax rates when growth is high as low 
economic growth leads to a lower interest rate and capital exports (see Bretschger and Hettich 
(2002), Adam and Kammas (2007)).  
Inflation, measured as the change in the GDP deflator (inflation), is expected to affect 
taxes through different channels. If tax law contains an amount expressed in nominal values 
(e.g. levels of tax brackets with progressive taxation or an amount of personal deduction for 
the income tax), inflation might affect tax revenues positively and negatively (Thuronyi, 
1996): First, taxpayers are pushed into higher labour income tax brackets and tax revenues 
rise at a higher rate than the tax base. The same may happen in the case of proportional 
business taxes if depreciation allowances are based on historical values. Second, due to 
collection lags in tax administration, inflation may lead to a decrease in ITRs as the tax base 
12 
increases at a higher rate than tax revenues. Third, if the tax base is measured in non-indexed 
nominal values, as is sometimes the case with property taxes or when tax revenues are based 
on “specific taxes”, inflation may cause an erosion of tax revenues and a decrease in the ITR. 
Government Party (gov_party) is an ordinal variable ranging from 1 to 5 that controls 
for the partisan effect (1 = hegemony of right-wing (and centre) parties, 5 = hegemony of 
social-democratic and other left parties (see Table A.2 for more details). The tax rates are 
expected to be lower, the more right wing the governing political parties tend to be, assuming 
that they would advocate a more neoliberal economic policy stance with tight fiscal policy 
and lower public expenditures, as well as lower taxes to stimulate business and increase 
labour supply.  
As smaller countries are typically more open than larger countries, a country‟s relative 
size (size) is included in the set of regressors following Winner (2005) in order to cope with a 
possible small country bias. This variable is measured as the proportion of a country‟s GDP to 
the average sample GDP. We expect a positive sign on the coefficient of this variable when 
explaining the variation in the ITR on capital income as larger countries have an incentive to 
levy higher tax rates (Bucovetsky (1991)). 
Tables A.1 to A.4 in the appendix contain information on the measurement of the 
variables, the databases used and descriptive statistics.  
 
V. ESTIMATION METHODOLOGY  
We explore the effect of globalization on the various ITRs by using the baseline model 
shown in Equation 1:  
    (1) 
where j = capital, labour or consumption. We estimate separate equations for the EU15 
and CEE NMS to allow for country-group-specific coefficients. Thus, the country index i 
ranges from 1 to 15 for the EU15 countries and from 1 to 10 for the included CEE NMS; t is 
the time index ranging from 1970 to 2006 for the EU15 and 1995 to 2006 for the CEE NMS. 
 represents the one year lagged globalization indicator.  is the matrix of one year 
lagged control variables outlined above.  captures country fixed effects, ωjt captures time 
fixed effects and  is the remainder error term. In the case of capital income taxes, we also 
estimate the EATR on corporate income as an alternative dependent variable to the ITR on 
capital income. 
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As described in section 2, we further test for the heterogeneity of the effects of 
globalization in different Western European welfare state regimes, i.e. the social-democratic, 
conservative, liberal and southern regime. Therefore, the following equation is estimated: 
 (2) 
where  is a dummy variable representing the different welfare regimes.  stands for the 
social-democratic regime. is 1 if a country belongs to the social-democratic welfare regime 
and zero otherwise.  stands for the conservative regime,  for the southern regime and  
for the liberal regime. The estimated coefficients  can be directly interpreted as the marginal 
effect of a one-unit increase in the respective globalization indicator on ITRj conditional on the 
respective welfare regime. The trend is also interacted with the regime dummies to account for 
path-dependency of the welfare regimes. As we include a full set of time dummies, one 
welfare specific trend cannot be identified. Therefore only three welfare specific trends are 
included into Equation (2). Including the fourth welfare-specific trend would not change the 
results as its impact is captured by . Due to data limitations, other control variables are not 
interacted. 
Globalization, as well as all the control variables except the fraction of elderly people 
and the government cabinet gravity,
 
enter into Equations 1 and 2 with a one year lag. This is 
done for two reasons: First, to cope with time lags in the political and fiscal decision process 
and, second, to mitigate potential problems due to endogeneity. A better way to cope with 
endogeneity issues would be to apply a GMM-approach. However, due to the low number of 
cross-sections (countries), a reliable GMM-estimation is precluded (also see Potrafke (2009)).
9
 
A second best approach is to use lagged values of the right hand side variables (see 
Wooldridge (2002: 301)). 
In each estimation the variance-covariance-matrix of the remainder error term, εjit, is calculated 
using the approach developed by Newey and West (1987). Therefore, standard errors are fully 
robust with respect to serial correlation as well as general heteroscedasticity (see Baum et al. 
(2007)).
10
  
Finally, note that we do not include a lagged dependent variable in the empirical 
models, as the resulting estimates would suffer from the Nickell-bias. As already noted, 
reliable GMM-estimation is precluded due to the small number of cross-sections. However, the 
                                                        
9 The cross-sectional dimensions are 15 (EU15) and 10 (CEE NMS), respectively. 
10 Newey-West-HAC robust standard errors are chosen as the alternative cluster-robust standard errors need a 
rather large number of clusters (here countries) for reliable inference. Typically a minimum cluster dimension of 
about 50 is required (see Nichols and Schaffer 2007). Estimations are carried out with Schaffer‟s xtivreg2 Stata 
command (see Schaffer (2010)). 
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inclusion of country-fixed effects, of the time fixed effects as well as of lagged total 
expenditures in the empirical models should account for inertia in the endogenous variable.  
 
VI. ESTIMATION RESULTS  
1. Globalization and effective tax rates in the EU15 and CEE NMS 
Table 1 shows the results for the basic specification in Equation (1) for EU15 and the 
CEE NMS using two alternative KOF globalization indices as explanatory variables. 
[Table 1 about here] 
For the EU15 neither KOFecon nor KOFglobal has a significant effect on the ITR on 
capital income, but domestic factors do affect capital taxes. As expected, size has a positive 
effect on the ITR on capital income. Larger countries have a higher tax burden on capital 
income which is in line with the predictions of the theoretical literature (see Bucovetsky, 
1991) and empirical findings (also see Adam and Kammas (2007), Bretschger and Hettich 
(2002), Garretsen and Peeters (2007), Winner (2005)). Total government expenditures as a 
share of GDP (expenditures) affect the ITR on capital positively, which is in line with the 
findings of Slemrod (2004).  Debt has a negative impact on the ITR on capital income. So 
debt and capital taxes are substitutes. Growth affects capital taxes negatively. This is in line 
with Adam and Kammas (2007) and Bretschger and Hettich (2002). The fraction of elderly 
people in total population (oldage) has the expected positive effect on the ITR on capital 
income. Time effects are jointly significant. 
Regarding the ITR on labour income in the EU15, both economic and total 
globalization indices have a significant and positive effect. The tax burden on the immobile 
factor is on the rise due to globalization. An increase in government expenditures leads to 
increasing labour taxes. In contrast to capital taxes, rising public debt leads to higher ITR on 
labour income, as also found by Swank and Steinmo (2002). Thus, public debt seems to be 
financed by taxes on labour. The fraction of elderly people again, as expected, has a positive 
effect on the ITR on labour income. Time fixed effects are jointly significant. 
In the case of the ITR on consumption in the EU15 both globalization indices have a 
negative significant effect. The negative effect on ITR on consumption may be due to several 
reasons: first, high agglomeration effects (more firms, infrastructure etc.) might offset the 
pressure to lower capital taxes and therefore also offset the pressure to increase other taxes 
(Dreher, 2008). Second, globalization leads to a decline in tariffs, and thereby taxes on 
consumption. Third, the decline in tariffs in turn puts a higher pressure on firms to compete in 
more open markets; lower value added taxes both lowers their costs of inputs and increases 
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demand for their output, and eases some of the competitive pressures; thus government may 
have an incentive to support their firms' competitiveness and demand via lower value added 
taxes. The relative size of the country positively affects the ITR on consumption. Rising total 
government expenditures imply an increase in ITR on consumption, whereas public debt has a 
negative impact. As with taxes on capital income, debt and consumption taxes are substitutes. 
The fraction of elderly people in total population has also a positive effect on ITR on 
consumption. Time fixed effects are jointly significant. 
Inflation and government party do not have an effect on any of the three ITRs in the 
EU15. The insignificant coefficient of partisan effect is in line with Dreher (2006a) and 
Swank and Steinmo (2002) and the zero-effect of inflation is consistent with Swank and 
Steinmo (2002).  
In the CEE NMS there is no effect of globalization on all three implicit tax rates. One 
reason for this could be that the restructuring of the tax system along western lines as well as 
the adaptation to globalization has already taken place in the early stage of transition which is 
not covered by our estimation period (Campbell (2005)).
11
 Regarding the effect of the 
domestic factors in the CEE NMS, only government expenditures as ratio to GDP and the 
composition of the government cabinet have impact on ITR on capital income. Higher 
expenditures lead to higher capital income tax rates. In contrast to the findings for the EU15, 
the government party has a significant and positive effect on the ITR on capital income. Thus, 
left-wing governments levy a higher tax burden on capital income. Time fixed effects were 
jointly insignificant, and therefore excluded.  
Economic growth has a negative effect on the ITR on labour income in the CEE NMS, 
while higher public expenditures imply a higher ITR on labour income. In contrast to taxes on 
capital, government party has a negative coefficient, which implies that left-wing parties levy 
a lower tax burden on labour income. Oldage is insignificant in the specification with 
KOFglobal, but has an unexpected negative effect on ITR on labour income in the 
specification with KOFecon. A higher share of pensionists may reduce the share of active 
labor and consequently the tax revenues from labor's income, since "pensions are usually 
exempted from income taxation or taxed at a lower rate than the rest of the labor's income" 
(Adam and Kammas, 2007:328). Relatively smaller CEE NMS have higher ITR on labour as 
indicated by the negative coefficient of size. Time fixed effects were jointly insignificant and 
                                                        
11 These results are robust, if we control for the effects of flat-tax reforms. To test this we introduced a flat-tax 
dummy in the empirical model. This dummy variable is 0 for countries which do not have a flat tax, and 1 for 
countries with a flat tax system, starting in the year when the flat tax was introduced. The results are available 
upon request. 
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are therefore excluded. The ITR on consumption in the CEE NMS is also positively affected 
by government expenditures. Gross consolidated public debt has a negative effect on 
consumption taxes, thus debt and consumption taxes are substitutes. As with labour taxes, 
left-wing governments levy a lower ITR on consumption. Time fixed effects are jointly 
significant. 
Next, we turn to the estimations with the EATR on corporate income as the dependent 
variable. The results are displayed in Table 2. In the EU15, we find a significant negative 
effect of economic globalization on EATR; the broad globalization index also has a 
marginally significant negative effect (p-value of 0.11). In the case of the CEE NMS, 
KOFglobal has a negative effect on the EATR, but the effect of KOFecon is not significant. 
The time effects are jointly significant in all specifications other than Specification 3 in Table 
2, where they are excluded. 
[Table 2 about here] 
How do our results compare to related literature?
12
  Our results pertaining to the 
absence of a significant effect of globalization on ITR on capital income are in line with 
Dreher et al. (2008), Swank and Steinmo (2002), and Swank (2006). However, Dreher 
(2006a) finds a positive effect while Winner (2005) finds a negative effect of globalization on 
the ITR on capital income. Adam and Kammas (2007), Bretschger (2008) and Bretschger and 
Hettich (2002) likewise find a negative effect of globalization, but they use the ITR on 
corporate income as the dependent variable. Their measures of globalization are also limited 
to the trade volume, the Quinn indices on capital or goods market integration, or the IMF 
index of restrictions on capital mobility. The difference in the sample (a subsample of the 
OECD countries vs. EU15) can also explain part of the difference. As we show below, there 
are differences in how different welfare regimes filter the effects of globalization on the ITRs. 
Thus, the results are sensitive to the country sample.  
Our results for the EATR on corporate income are in line with the studies of Krogstrup 
(2005), Dreher (2006a), Garretsen and Peeters (2007) and Loretz (2008). The question that 
arises is why globalization has no effect on ITR on capital income but a negative effect on 
EATR. One reason for this might be that the EATR strongly depends on the development in 
the STR (see Devereux and Griffith (1998)). STRs have an important signalling function for 
investors and are therefore an object of tax competition –much more so than ITRs (Ganghof 
(2000)). Therefore, studies explaining the EATR tend to find negative effects.  
                                                        
12
 Given that most of the former literature is for pools of sub-samples of OECD countries, the comparison is 
based on the results for the EU15 only. 
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Devereux et al. (2002) provide several reasons for the differences between EATR and 
ITR related to the differences concerning the measurement of the tax bases (ex post vs. ex 
ante) and the use of national accounts data vs. tax law data. Moreover, ITR on capital income 
include not only corporate taxation, but also inheritance, estate, property, stamp and gift taxes 
and the tax revenues contain not only source paid taxes (as with EATR), but also residence-
based taxes (revenue collected from profits earned abroad and repatriated). Swank (1998) and 
Swank (2006) provide a further reason why globalization might have no effect on ITR on 
capital income. He argues that there has been a general policy shift from „market conforming‟ 
to „market regulating‟ policy caused by a spread of neoliberal policy and theory. 
Government‟s aim changed from redistribution to promoting growth by encouraging 
investment. So the change in tax policy may not only be caused by globalization, but also by a 
general change in policy. This policy shift is also in line with the cutting of the tax rates and 
broadening of the tax base, which means that the policy goals shifted from redistribution 
towards efficiency as the deadweight-loss of taxation depends in a non-linear way on the 
statutory tax rate and on the possibilities to substitute taxable income with non-taxed items. 
Regarding the ITR on labour, the positive effect of globalization in the EU15 is in line 
with Dreher et al. (2008), Adam and Kammas (2007) and Winner (2005). Bretschger and 
Hettich (2002) also find a shift of the tax burden to labour income, although they do not 
estimate the effect on the ITR on labour income separately, but rather in the form of the ratio 
of taxes on capital to labour. However, Dreher (2006a) finds no effect and Swank and 
Steinmo (2002) find a negative effect on the ITR on labour income.
13
 
In contrast to our study, other studies estimating the effect of globalization on the ITR 
on consumption do not find a significant effect (Swank and Steinmo (2002); Dreher (2006a); 
Dreher et al. (2008)), whereas we find a negative effect in the EU15. 
 
2.  Globalization, taxes and welfare regimes in EU15 
Table 3 reports the results of the effect of globalization in different welfare regimes. 
The time fixed effects are jointly significant in all specifications other than in specification 8. 
The welfare regime specific trends are also jointly significant in all specifications other than 
in specification 5, where they are excluded. 
 
                                                        
13 It is also worth noting that the rise in the tax burden on labour in the EU15 is in particular driven by 
increasing social security contributions (Ganghof (2000); Adam and Kammas (2007)). Social security 
contributions are often capped, and therefore have a regressive effect (Glyn (2006)). So aside from the increasing 
tax burden on labour income, there is a bottom up redistribution of the tax burden within labour (Prasad (2008)).   
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[Table 3 about here] 
 
There is an interesting difference between the welfare regimes particularly in the case 
of ITR on capital income. According to our estimations there is a significant negative effect of 
globalization on the ITR on capital income in both the social-democratic and the southern 
welfare regimes. In the social-democratic regime this result is robust to the selection of the 
globalization indicator whereas in the southern regime the effect stems only from total 
globalization. In the liberal regime there is also a negative effect of total globalization, which 
is borderline significant (p-value of 0.11). Our results indicate that in the southern, social-
democratic and liberal welfare regime the efforts to attract or keep the mobile factor of 
production have led to a downward pressure on ITR on capital. In the southern regime this 
can be explained by other location or productivity disadvantages of these countries. In the 
liberal regime it is in line with the political preferences to attract capital by offering lower tax 
rates. The pressure in the social-democratic countries may be due to their initial conditions 
with higher ITR on capital in the 1980s. 
A rise of globalization implies an increase in the ITR on labour income in all four 
welfare regimes. Except for the southern regimes the effect is robust to the measure of 
globalization; in the southern regime the significant effect is due to total globalization. This is 
interesting, as southern countries showed the strongest increase in labour taxes. Apparently, 
this rise is due to social and political globalization as well as domestic factors rather than the 
economic dimension of globalization. The positive effect of economic globalization is the 
largest in the social-democratic regime. This might be considered in line with the broad 
agreement of the labour unions in the social-democratic countries to preserve the 
competitiveness of their firms while preserving a certain level of social welfare regime. 
However, the effect of total globalization in the liberal regime is relatively pronounced. The 
political and social dimensions of globalization seem to have brought in additional upward 
convergence effects within the liberal regime.  
Globalization has a negative effect on ITR on consumption in the social-democratic, 
conservative and liberal welfare regimes while there is no effect in the southern welfare 
regime. The negative significant effect is robust to the measure of globalization in the social-
democratic and conservative regimes, but not in the liberal regime, where the negative effect 
is only due to total globalization. 
We also tested the effects of globalization on EATR on corporate income in different 
welfare state regimes within the EU15. The results are displayed in the last two columns of 
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Table 3. Globalization has a negative effect on EATR on corporate income in the 
conservative, southern and liberal regimes, but the result differs according to the measure of 
globalization: economic globalization has a negative effect in the conservative and southern 
regimes, and total globalisation in the liberal regime. In the social-democratic welfare regime 
economic globalization has a negative effect as well, but it is only marginally significant (p-
value of 0.11). 
Finally, we carried out several robustness checks in all specifications in Tables 1-3. 
First we excluded inflation, since it is in most cases insignificant. Secondly, we used 
unemployment instead of growth as a proxy for cyclical effects. This specification is 
estimated with and without inflation. The results regarding globalization are robust.
14
  
 
VII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
This paper analyzes the effects of globalization on the ITR on labour income, capital 
income, and consumption with an emphasis on the differences between the EU15 and CEE 
NMS as well as differences among welfare regimes in the EU15. Overall, our results confirm 
that globalization leads to a higher tax burden on labour income in the EU15: there is a 
positive effect of globalization on the ITR on labour income in the EU15, but no effect on the 
ITR on capital income. In the case of the ITR on consumption globalization has a negative 
effect. 
The most striking difference arises between the EU15 and the CEE NMS; in the latter 
there is no effect of globalization on any of the three ITRs. Another difference between the 
EU15 and the CEE NMS is that the government party plays a more important role in the 
latter. Left wing governments levy a higher tax burden on capital income and a lower tax 
burden on labour income and consumption in the CEE NMS. 
There are also differences between the welfare regimes within the EU15. Globalization 
has a significant negative effect on the ITR on capital income in the social-democratic and 
southern regimes, a borderline significant negative effect in the liberal regime, and no 
significant effect in the conservative welfare regime. Regarding the ITR on consumption, 
there is a significant negative effect of globalization in the social-democratic, conservative, 
and liberal welfare regimes. In the case of the ITR on labour income we find evidence that 
globalization causes an increase in all four welfare regimes.   
                                                        
14
 The results are available upon request. 
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Figure 1a: Effective average tax rate on corporate income (unweighted average) in the EU15, 
1982-2005  
 
Data Source: IFS and Devereux et al. (2008) 
 
Figure 1b: Effective average tax rate on corporate income (unweighted average) in the CEE 
NMS, 1998-2007  
 
Data Source: Devereux et al. (2008) 
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Figure 2a: Implicit tax rates on capital income in the EU15 and the CEE NMS 1970 – 2007 
 
 
Figure 2b: Implicit tax rates on labour income in the EU15 and the CEE NMS, 1970 – 2007 
 
 
Figure 2c: Implicit tax rates on consumption in the EU15 and the CEE NMS 1970 – 2007 
 
Data Source: Eurostat, European Commission (2000) 
Note: Due to shorter time series, Romania and Bulgaria have been excluded, as their inclusion in the later years 
and absence in the earlier years impose a misleading change in the trend of the aggregate average for the region 
as a whole. 
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Table 1: The effects of globalization on implicit tax rate on capital income, labour income and consumption, two-way fixed effects estimation; time 
period: 1970-2006 for EU15, 1995 - 2006 for CEE NMS 
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Table 2: The effects of globalization on effective average tax rates on capital income, two-
way fixed effects estimation; time period: 1982-2005 for EU15, 1998 - 2006 for CEE NMS 
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Table 3: The effects of globalization on implicit tax rate on capital income, labour income, 
consumption, and the effective average tax rate on corporate income in the different welfare 
regimes in the EU15, two-way fixed effects estimation; time period: 1970-2006*.  
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Appendix 
Table A. 1: Data Availability 
Implicit tax rates 
1970-2007: BE, GE, DE, FR, IE, IT, LU (no  ITR on capital available), NE, UK 
1980- 2007: AT,ES, FI, GR, PT, SE 
1995-2007: CZ, EE, HU (ITR on capital since 2000), LT, LV, PL, SK, SI  
Later than 1995: BG 1999 - 2007, RO: ITR on capital 1998-2004, ITR on labour and consumption 1999-2007 
All data from Eurostat; ITR on capital for BG, HU, RO, SI partly own calculations 
Effective average tax rates 
1998-2007: AT, BE, CZ, GE, DE, EE, ES, FI, FR, GR, HU, IE, IT, LT, LU, LV, NE, PL, PT, SE, SI SK, UK 
1982-2005: AT, BE, GE, ES, FI, FR, GR, IE, IT, NE, PT, SE, UK 
 
Table A. 1: Data Sources and Description 
KOFglob Index of economic, political, and social globalization, ranging from 1 to 100 ETH Zurich, KOF 1970-2006 
KOFecon KOF Index of economic globalization, combining actual flows and restrictions,  
 
ETH Zurich, KOF 1970-2006 
growth Growth rate of real GDP  AMECO 1970-2007 
debt General government consolidated gross debt AMECO 1970-2007 
inflation Inflation, GDP deflator (def_GDP-def_GDP(-1))/def_GDP(-1) AMECO 1970-2007 
expenditures Total expenditures of general government as percentage of GDP AMECO 1970-2007 
oldage Population>64 as percentage of total population AMECO 1970-2007 
gov_party govparty Cabinet composition (Schmidt-Index):  
(1) hegemony of right-wing (and centre) 
 (2) dominance of right-wing (and centre) parties 
 (3) balance of power between left and right 
 (4) dominance of social-democratic and other left parties 
 (5) hegemony of social-democratic and other left parties 
Comparative political 
Dataset I and III (for 
CEEC), University of 
Bern 
1970-2007 
size GDP as share of GDP of the sample (in t) AMECO 1970-2007 
ITR cap Implicit tax rates on capital income Eurostat, European 
Commission 
1970-2007 
ITR con Implicit tax rate on consumption Eurostat, European 
Commission 
1970-2007 
ITR lab Implicit tax rate on labour income Eurostat, European 
Commission 
1970-2007 
EATR, CEE NMS effective average tax rate on capital income Devereux et al.. (2008) 1998-2007 
EATR, EU15 effective average tax rate on capital income IFS and Devereux et 
al.. (2008) 
1982-2005 
 
Table A. 2: Data Summary – EU15 1970-2007 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
ITR cap 471 26.92389 9.020406 7.035894 56.0146 
ITR lab 510 33.26076 7.575503 8.167932 49.4 
ITR con 510 21.18629 5.475494 5.429917 34 
EATR 312 28.3315 9.054362 5 48.14182 
KOFglobal 555 72.53857 12.36946 46.58926 92.63542 
KOFecon 555 70.79017 15.91551 39.57584 98.71632 
size 570 6.399091 7.071815 0.1470244 24.26684 
growth 570 2.972333 2.428373 -6.571302 11.49454 
expend 432 47.93289 6.69618 29.26713 71.68213 
debt 554 51.54973 29.27375 4.0563 134.1601 
oldage 569 14.16474 2.139734 9.150367 19.99225 
infl 570 6.311238 5.552342 -1.876682 27.21265 
govparty 552 2.650362 1.469299 1 5 
 
Table A.4: Data Summary – CEE NMS 1995-2007 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
ITRcap 114 16.11934 6.474288 4.9 35.1 
ITR lab 122 36.71066 3.39788 28 43.7 
ITR con 122 20.96557 3.278978 15.5 30.8 
EATR 80 20.725 4.666891 12.7 36.7 
KOFglobal 120 72.31573 7.866955 50.53387 85.15943 
KOFecon 120 71.66487 11.92914 37.1984 92.30254 
size 130 0.4731876 0.5502601 0.0560642 2.250158 
growth 130 4.81797 3.322996 -9.39712 12.23314 
expend 125 41.56814 5.620584 33.1694 54.46833 
debt 123 30.08343 20.21959 3.4876 105.0563 
oldage 130 14.20665 1.673192 10.87208 17.28471 
infl 130 19.34649 84.32772 -0.8533621 948.2813 
govparty 120 2.65 1.149717 1 5 
 
 
 
